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Corruption is a huge barrier to tackling the triple planetary crisis: climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution. Countering corruption is crucial not just nationally, but globally, to ensure the future of all species.

This EFI Insight distills from the implementation of Beneficial Ownership Registers (BORs) in Nigeria, North Macedonia, Kenya, and the United Kingdom. The experiences of these countries offer valuable lessons for similar reform efforts worldwide aimed at enhancing beneficial ownership transparency.

Information communication technology (ICT) contracts are prone to fraud, corruption, bid rigging and collusion. The OECD foreign bribery report which shows that in 2014, 10 percent of the foreign bribery cases occurred in ICT sector. Integrated financial management systems (IFMIS) and other ICT systems play important roles in improving transparency and accountability and reducing the opportunities for fraud and corruption in developing countries. The procurement and implementation of such systems, however, present significant opportunities for abuse.

Corruption poses a significant threat to development and has a disproportionate impact on the poor and most vulnerable. Government agencies struggle to identify fraud and corruption in public expenditures. Risk assessments usually rely on manual analysis and follow-up on specific complaints or anecdotes which requires substantial resources. Assessments are often limited in scope and ineffective, failing to generate the evidence needed to build strong cases. Å·ÃÀÈÕb´óƬ developed the Governance Risk Assessment System (GRAS), a tool that uses advanced data analytics to improve the detection of risks of fraud, corruption, and collusion in government contracting. GRAS increases the efficiency and effectiveness of audits and investigations by identifying a wide range of risk patterns. GRAS makes use of public data and is based on a robust and comprehensive conceptual framework which draws on insights from experienced practitioners and sound academic research.

This note describes how political economy analysis can be used to promote development, focusing specifically on state capture. It is intended to help practitioners within the World Bank execute and disseminate political economy analysis of state capture. It is not intended to be comprehensive but serves as a how-to guide for those not intimately familiar with the topic.

The report benchmarks eight countries in the Middle East and North Africa Region along the proposed framework through a checklist of indicators, pointing to policy gaps and poor governance features that make these countries prone to capture and discretion. It offers a menu of operational and technical entry points to engage local policy makers on the capture agenda in a concrete way, one that may be more politically tractable in some of the World Bank¡¯s client countries. The report does not provide additional analytical evidence on their impact on private sector growth. It takes the work by the Bank and other development organizations as evidence about the presence of privileges and focuses on the question: What can policy makers do? This note provides a summary of the framework, methodology, and operational guidelines to help the World Bank¡¯s teams apply a benchmarking tool within and across countries. It is intended mostly for analysts and task team leaders from the World Bank or other organizations to assist them in identifying a country¡¯s vulnerabilities and its various policy areas in terms of its legal framework and enforcement mechanisms. It also presents ways to leverage the Bank¡¯s instruments to address those vulnerabilities and make policies more privilege resistant.

The paper curate¡¯s knowledge residing in public documents and aims to distill lessons learned on how to adopt and use AI as part of a public sector modernization strategy. The paper¡¯s primary scope is on governance-related aspects. Chapter two elaborates on the opportunities being availed by governmentsaround the world using AI. These opportunities should be availed while managing associated risks, which are discussed in chapter three. For maximizing opportunities and managing risks, governments need to adopt AI ethical principles and institutional arrangements, discussed in chapter four. Chapter five discusses the ethical dimensions that need a broader policy response at the national level. Chapter six enumerates the building blocks necessary for a successful long-term AI strategy. The appendices contain information for practitioners. Appendix A provides technical information and additional resources for further support, and Appendix B highlights solutions that rely on AI for improvements in efficiency, scientific analysis, and prediction within the disciplines. To fully comprehend the impact that AI might have on governments, it is necessary to develop a solid understanding of key AI concepts. The paper does not offer in-depth coverage of work in specific sectors. The findings in the paper were validated through interviews with industry experts. Special efforts have been made to ensure the architectural design approaches discussed in the paper incorporate the best industry knowledge. The paper goes to great lengths to maintain a practical approach, with ¡®handson¡¯ examples of architectures and applications.

The Guide is intended as a resource for policymakers, practitioners and civil society in strengthening conflict of interest regulations and systems. It illustrates experiences and good practices in managing and preventing conflicts of interest from countries in the G20 and beyond, drawing on the experience and expertise of the World Bank, the OECD and the UNODC. The Guide supplements the G20 High-Level Principles for Preventing and Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Public Sector, adopted by the G20 Anticorruption Working Group in 2018. Each chapter in this Guide begins by identifying the relevant High-Level Principles addressed in each section.

According to the United Nations every year an estimated US$1 trillion is paid in bribes and US$2.6 trillion stolen through corruption. Together, this sum represents five (5) percent of annual global GDP. Further, in developing countries, funds lost to corruption are estimated to be 10 times the amount of overall Official Development Assistance. The inverse link between corruption and successful development outcomes has been well established: corruption deters investment and impedes economic growth, exacerbates income inequality, increases the cost of government services, lowers trust in government and increases political instability.